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Parenting and families 
Rebecca Sear 
 
 
Introduction 
Parenting in Homo sapiens is rather different to parenting in most other primates. Our 
long developmental period and relatively short birth intervals mean that offspring are ‘stacked’, 
with mothers having to simultaneously look after several dependent children at different 
developmental stages. This creates a high burden of care for mothers, which mothers appear to 
alleviate by co-opting other relatives into helping out. This cooperative breeding strategy 
introduces complexity into ‘parental’ investment: various individuals may be investing in 
children, not just parents, but also grandparents, older siblings of the child and potentially step-
parents. The stacking of human offspring also introduces complexity into the allocation of 
parental investment across children within the same family, given that a number of children of 
different ages will be competing with one another for parental resources.  
This chapter surveys the relevant literature on human parental investment. It first 
introduces parental investment theory, and then discusses the issue of who invests in human 
children. Mothers clearly invest, but who else helps out? This section ends with a brief 
discussion of familial conflict, since family relationships may be competitive, as well as 
cooperative. The second half of the chapter starts by considering what is invested in children, 
and then moves on to a detailed examination of who is invested in, with particular reference to 
parental investment biases according to sex and birth order. Throughout, ecological variation in 
parenting and parental investment patterns are considered.  
What is parental investment? 
Parental investment is defined as any action by a parent who benefits an offspring at 
some cost to the parent. The concept was originally formulated by Trivers, who defined parental 
investment rather precisely as investment in an offspring which results in some cost to the 
parent’s ability to invest in other offspring (Trivers, 1972). Subsequently, Clutton-Brock (1991) 
broadened the definition to include investment in offspring which has a cost to any component 
of a parent’s fitness, including mating success or somatic maintenance. Parental investment is a 
key concept in life history theory (LHT; see Lawson, in this volume). Given a limited energy 
budget, LHT predicts that parents have a number of decisions, or trade-offs, to make, in order to 
allocate energy appropriately to maximise their fitness (Roff, 1992; Stearns, 1992).  
The three most fundamental trade-offs of LHT concern parental investment. First, any 
energy devoted towards parenting cannot also be used for other functions, such as mating or 
maintaining body condition. So parents must trade-off parenting effort with mating effort and 
with somatic maintenance. Second, since there is a trade-off between current and future 
reproduction, parents must decide how much to invest in a current offspring (or litter), in order 
to conserve energy for future reproductive bouts. Finally, parenting effort must be traded-off 
between quality and quantity of offspring. Parents may either produce many offspring but invest 
relatively little in each one (the quantity strategy), or produce few offspring but invest 
considerably in each (the quality strategy). Parents engaged in the quality strategy must then 
decide how to allocate investment between their offspring, since equal investment in each may 
not be the optimal strategy. 
Our own species is one in which parents adopt the quality strategy, by investing 
substantially in a relatively small number of offspring. Human children are relatively altricial at 
birth (that is, relatively helpless, in contrast to many species which have precocial young, who 
are relatively independent of parental care from birth), and have an unusually extended period of 
childhood during which they are reliant on carers for provisioning and protection (Bogin, 1997). 
Children are not able to fully provision themselves until well into their teens or later: delayed 
maturity means they do not reach full adult size or strength into this age and our ecological 
niche, which relies on difficult to acquire foodstuffs, means that children must engage in a long 
period of learning before becoming proficient producers of calories (Kaplan et al., 2000; Hill, 
1993). Even after maturity, the social and group-living nature of our species results in lifelong 
bonds between parents and offspring, so that parents may continue to invest in offspring by 
transferring resources, providing grandparenting services, and social support well beyond 
reproductive maturity. Before discussing in more detail exactly what is invested in children, and 
how this investment is shared out between children within the same family, we will start with a 
consideration of who invests in children.  
Who invests in offspring? 
  Parental investment may come from mothers, fathers or both, but maternal investment is 
rather more common than paternal (Clutton-Brock, 1991). Explanations for this biased 
investment pattern have tended in the past to hinge on anisogamy (the difference in size between 
male and female gametes): it seems to make intuitive sense that females should invest more 
heavily than males throughout the period of parental investment, since the larger size of eggs 
compared to sperm means that females are committed to investing relatively heavily at the 
outset (Trivers, 1972). Recently, Kokko and Jennions (2008) have cautioned that such 
arguments, while superficially appealing, have logical flaws and that the full explanation for sex 
differences in parental investment may be relatively complex. The anisogamy argument for 
female-biased parental investment makes the Concorde fallacy, for example (Dawkins & 
Carlisle 1976). Decisions about whether to continue investing in an offspring should depend 
only on the future costs and benefits of investing or ceasing to invest in that offspring, and 
should disregard how much has already been invested (a strategy not adopted by the French and 
British governments, who continued to invest in Concorde long after it become obvious the 
aircraft was a poor economic bet because they did not want to be seen to have wasted the 
considerable amounts they had already invested).  
Anisogamy, and the relative cheapness of sperm to produce, also provides a superficially 
appealing explanation for why males would do better to invest effort in attracting additional 
mates rather than investing in parenting – since each additional female fertilised may result in a 
greater increase in reproductive success compared to any incremental benefit obtained through 
improving the survival and reproductive prospects of existing offspring. But again, this 
argument needs some refinement. Although such a strategy of pursuing mates rather than 
investing in offspring may benefit males who are particularly successful at acquiring mates, 
every offspring has one mother and one father so that the average male will not succeed in 
fertilising large numbers of females. It is also not necessarily clear that investing effort in 
finding additional matings always increases reproductive success more than investing in parental 
care.  
Kokko and Jennions (2008) suggest that a more cautious and subtle approach is taken to 
understanding why maternal care tends to be more common than paternal, taking into account a 
number of factors. These include: the importance of sexual selection, which will determine 
whether some males can lucratively adopt a mating-focused strategy; both adult and operational 
sex ratios (the former refers to the ratio of adult males to females, the latter to the ratio of 
sexually receptive males to females), which again affects the costs and benefits of searching for 
mates rather than caring for offspring; the effects of caring or competing on mortality rates, 
which will in turn affect sex ratios, and; the probability of paternity. 
The considerable variation in this list of factors across species means that, though 
maternal care is numerically more common than paternal care, there are numerous species in 
which paternal care, either alone or alongside maternal care, is seen (Clutton-Brock, 1991). 
Male-only care is in fact the predominant mode of parental care in fish, though it is rare in other 
classes of animal and not seen in mammals. Biparental care is by far the most common mode of 
care in birds, seen in 90% of species (note, however, that biparental care does not necessarily 
mean that males and females contribute equally to parental care, just that both contribute; 
Cockburn, 2006). Female-only care is the most common mammalian pattern, where any kind of 
male care is relatively rare: direct care from males is seen in less than 5% of species and 9-10% 
of genera. Primate fathers seem to be at the caring end of the mammalian spectrum. Though 
female-only care is still seen in the majority of species, direct male care has been observed in 
40% of primate genera (Kleiman & Malcolm, 1981).  
One problem with quantifying paternal investment is that what fathers do for offspring 
can be difficult to identify. The statistics above refer to direct forms of parental care. This 
includes care directed towards an offspring which has an immediate effect on the survival or 
well-being of the young, such as feeding, carrying, or grooming. Indirect care is care performed 
in the absence of the offspring but which may also have an effect on its health or survival, such 
as territorial defence. The problem with counting indirect care as paternal investment is that its 
primary purpose may not be parental investment. Territorial defence will also prevent other 
males from gaining access to females residing within the territory, so that it may be mating 
effort which fortuitously happens also to improve offspring reproductive success. In fact, this 
problem applies more generally to male care, even direct forms of care: is male care always 
parental investment, or is it mating effort? If females prefer males who provide useful services 
to their offspring, then males may use caring for offspring to attract females, rather than solely 
for the purposes of improving the reproductive prospects of their offspring (Smuts & Gubernick, 
1992).  
A final complication with identifying paternal investment is that it can be difficult to 
determine whether the objects of male care are in fact his offspring, which is why the literature 
on this topic often refers to ‘male care’ rather than ‘paternal investment’. Maternal care, at least 
in species with internal fertilisation, such as birds and mammals, is more difficult to mistake. 
The biparental care which characterises most bird species was initially thought to be a clear-cut 
case of paternal investment, but the advent of DNA fingerprinting demonstrated that a 
surprisingly high proportion of chicks in the nests of some species were the results of extra-pair 
copulations and were not the offspring of the male caring for them (Petrie & Kempenaers, 
1998). Male care which is consistently directed towards unrelated offspring may well be a form 
of mating effort, though it is also possible that it results from misdirected parental effort. 
This brief zoological summary of who cares for offspring suggests that the subject is 
complicated. Observations suggest that where post-natal investment occurs it is most common 
from mothers alone, sometimes from both mothers and fathers and sometimes just fathers, but 
that the reasons for this variation are numerous and not yet fully understood. The next section 
covers the question of who cares for children in our own species. 
Who invests in human children?  
Clearly, mothers invest substantially. As with all mammals, human females are 
committed to gestation and a lengthy period of lactation, which typically lasts at least two years, 
often longer, in traditional societies (those without access to modern medical care or 
contraception, where both fertility and mortality tend to be high). A review of child mortality in 
such societies suggested that children who lose their mothers in the first year or two of life have 
very much higher risks of dying than those whose mothers are still alive, demonstrating the 
almost exclusive reliance of infants on maternal care (Sear & Mace, 2008; see Figure 7.1). The 
reliance of children on maternal care once they are weaned appears to be surprisingly low, 
however: the survival of slightly older children (more than two years) who lose their mothers is 
often remarkably high. Two-year-old children are clearly not able to feed and care for 
themselves, so some other individual(s) must be stepping in to invest in these children. The 
father of the child might appear to be the obvious candidate for this alternative carer, but is that 
what the evidence shows? 
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 7.1 about here 
------------------------ 
 How extensive is paternal investment in humans? 
Much of the evolutionary psychological literature gives the impression that paternal 
investment is universal and substantial in Homo sapiens. It is not uncommon for evolutionary 
psychologists to base arguments about our evolved mental architecture around assumptions that 
men invest heavily in children, and that women universally seek men who are willing and able 
to invest in children (Geary, 2000; Geary et al., 2004; Buss, 1989). These assumptions build on a 
long-standing belief amongst students of human origins that the provisioning of women and 
children by men has been of vital importance in human evolution, and led to many distinctly 
human characteristics.  
This idea perhaps reached its apotheosis in a 1981 Science article by Owen Lovejoy on 
how the “origin of man” (sic) depended on behavioural shifts towards the nuclear family and 
extensive male provisioning of women and children (Lovejoy, 1981). This view has proved 
remarkably hard to shift (see e.g. Lawrence & Nohria, 2002) despite a concerted assault on this 
hypothesis over the last few decades by researchers attempting, and failing, to find evidence that 
heavy paternal investment is universal in our species. The alternative perspective, now accepted 
by much of the behavioural ecology community, is that the role of human fathers is very 
variable, and may be surprisingly inconsequential. Surprisingly, because children need 
substantial investment in order to reach adulthood as healthy, competitive adults (Hrdy, 2009).  
Whether you consider human fathers to be paragons of paternal investment or somewhat 
paternally delinquent depends to some extent on your frame of reference. Geary (2000), for 
example, argues that compared to the average mammal, human fathers do seem to be unusually 
closely involved in their offspring: many men do maintain relationships and invest substantially 
in their offspring throughout childhood and beyond, in contrast to the majority of mammalian 
fathers who have no contact with offspring after conception. On the other hand, Hrdy (2008) 
points out that human paternal investment appears somewhat less impressive when only 
primates are considered, since primate fathers are rather more likely than the average mammal to 
engage in care of offspring. In some species, such as siamang (a South East Asian ape), titi 
monkeys, owl monkeys, and some callitrichids (marmosets and tamarins), male care is intensive 
and essential for offspring survival. For example, the father is often responsible for carrying 
infants, which incurs substantial energetic costs.  
Yet in our own species, at least some fathers invest little or nothing at all. In post-
industrial societies, a high proportion of divorced and never-married fathers lose contact with 
their children and invest little or nothing after the dissolution of the parental relationship 
(Seltzer, 1991). Hrdy (2008) even quotes a study which found that Americans are 16 times more 
likely to pay used car loans than their child support payments. A similar picture of variable 
paternal investment is found in traditional societies: the same review of child mortality which 
found much higher mortality for young children without mothers found that when the effects of 
fathers on child mortality are investigated, in only one third of studies (7 of 22) did the absence 
of fathers result in higher child mortality (Sear & Mace, 2008; see Figure 7.1). These results are 
not expected if fathers are always vital to the provisioning and care of women and children. 
Despite their different perspectives, however, both Hrdy and Geary agree on the fact that 
paternal investment, unlike maternal investment, is facultative in our species: some fathers 
invest in their offspring and some do not, though they might disagree on the extent to which 
fathers invest. Given that there is agreement that paternal investment can vary both between both 
between and within populations, the next question becomes: what determines the extent to 
which a particular father will invest? A pre-condition of paternal investment is a social system in 
which fathers and offspring maintain bonds and can recognise one another (Chapais, 2008). 
Human societies fit this condition: in most, women and men form reasonably long-term unions, 
and even in the absence of such long-term bonds, men’s role in generating children is often 
understood so that biological paternity can be recognised (see Box 7.1 for a brief overview of 
the form of the human family). Given a set-up in which paternal investment is at least possible, 
how much individual fathers then choose to invest will be determined by some combination of 
the following factors: paternity certainty, and the costs and benefits of investing in offspring 
versus investing in additional mating effort (Kleiman & Malcolm, 1981; Kempenaers & 
Sheldon, 1997).  
------------------------ 
Insert Box 7.1 about here 
------------------------ 
What affects paternal investment: Paternity certainty 
Paternity certainty refers to the probability that a man’s putative children (often 
operationalised as his wife’s children) are his own genetic offspring. Cross-cultural studies 
suggest paternity certainty rates are rather high in most human populations, but are not 100%. 
There is something of an urban myth that paternity uncertainty is widespread in humans, based 
on an unpublished study using blood group data which apparently estimated that 20-30% of 
children in one Liverpool towerblock were not the offspring of their putative fathers (sometimes 
known as the ‘Liverpool flats’ study, cited in Cohen, 1977). While paternity uncertainty might 
be this high under a particular set of circumstances, most human fathers appear to have a 
considerably higher confidence of paternity.  
Anderson recently reviewed the cross-cultural evidence and suggested the range of 
paternity uncertainty was 1.9-3.9% (Anderson, 2006). Such low figures suggest either that 
women rarely conceive children through extra-pair matings, and/or that men are good at 
detecting any such children so that paternity is generally not mistaken. Low paternity 
uncertainty, therefore, does not necessarily imply the existence of lifelong and faithful pair-
bonds. It simply means that, on the whole, paternity of children is usually correctly attributed. In 
‘partible paternity’ societies, for example, such as some forager communities in South America, 
women form relationships with several men, often simultaneously (Beckerman et al., 2002; Hill 
& Hurtado, 1996). Children have multiple ‘fathers’ in these societies, since a ‘father’ is defined 
as any man who had sex with the mother during or around the time of pregnancy. But there is a 
hierarchy of such fathers, with ‘primary’ fathers being more likely to be the biological father, 
than ‘secondary’ fathers.  
The study by Anderson (2006) did not include any partible paternity studies, and has been 
criticised for relying heavily on agricultural and industrialised societies (Hrdy, 2009), and 
including too few forager societies – as unfortunately do the majority of such cross-cultural 
studies given that relatively few foraging communities exist today. The advent of agriculture 
allowed the accumulation of wealth to a much greater extent than is possible in forager societies, 
which is likely to have changed relationships between men and women (Kaplan & Lancaster, 
2003). When resources can feasibly be acquired and accumulated men tend to do so, in order to 
attract mates (Holden & Mace, 2003). In situations where men control resources, women 
become more dependent on men, and men’s bargaining power within relationships increases. 
This allows them to demand exclusive sexual access to their wives, resulting in relatively high 
rates of paternity confidence. Whether men demand exclusive sexual access primarily because 
they do not want the paternal investment they intend to bestow on their children to be wasted on 
another man’s child, or because they want to monopolise their wives’ reproductive capacity and 
exclude other males from the mating pool is a question which is difficult to answer, given that 
both benefits are likely to accrue from mate-guarding. 
Regardless of the exact level of paternity uncertainty, there is clearly at least some room 
for doubt in a man’s relationship with his putative offspring. If he is considering whether to 
invest substantial resources in an offspring, he should take the risk of paternity uncertainty into 
account.  
What affects paternal investment: Costs and benefits of parenting versus mating 
The costs and benefits of investing in further mating effort rather than parenting effort 
will depend on both the availability of other mating opportunities, and on the sensitivity of 
offspring to male care. In our own species, whether children are heavily dependent on paternal 
investment for their health and well-being is often not empirically tested; instead it is simply 
assumed to be the case. It is worthwhile, therefore, to consider the evidence available on what it 
is that men do for their children, and what impact this has on the children. The forager literature 
has tended to focus on male provisioning of children, since this has long been assumed to be the 
father’s main role in the human family. Cross-cultural analysis suggests that men do contribute 
substantially to production in hunger-gatherer societies, but so do women. On average, men 
bring back just over half the calories consumed by a group, women just under half (Marlowe, 
2005). Similar results have been obtained when cross-cultural analysis is broadened to other 
subsistence strategies (Hewlett, 2000).  
Some anthropologists working on African hunter-gatherers have questioned, however, 
whether the main purpose of the hunting that men do in such societies is the provisioning of 
children (Hawkes, 2004; Hawkes & Bird, 2002). Meat, particularly large game, tends to be 
shared fairly widely among the whole camp, rather than directed at the hunter’s own children. 
The ‘show-off’ hypothesis for hunting, then, suggests that men’s hunting efforts are at least 
partially directed towards attracting additional mates, rather than solely providing for children 
(Hawkes, 1991). The higher mating success of successful hunters attests to the success of this 
strategy (Kaplan & Hill, 1985).  
Anthropologists working on South American foragers, in contrast, present evidence that 
most hunted game does end up with the hunter’s own family, and argue more strongly for 
hunting as parental effort (Gurven & Hill, 2009). This group has recently tried to devise tests 
which tease apart mating from parenting effort in the Tsimane (Bolivian forager-farmers) by 
investigating the patterning of direct male care, and concluded that their evidence shows more 
support for parenting rather than mating effort (Winking et al., 2009). Such research only 
highlights the difficulty of distinguishing the mating and parenting hypotheses, however, since 
the services men provide to children could serve both purposes simultaneously. Perhaps the only 
conclusion to be drawn is that hunting and other male efforts may serve as both mating and 
parenting effort, though the relative balance between the two may differ between societies. 
There is similar confusion in the literature on non-forager populations about what 
constitutes paternal investment. In stratified societies, well-known links between higher paternal 
socioeconomic status or education and positive child outcomes have been cited as evidence for 
paternal investment (Geary, 2000). In the post-industrial world, fathers are of great interest to 
policy-makers, where they are assumed to be vital to a child’s functioning and success in this 
particular environment. A large body of research has suggested that children without fathers 
have poorer outcomes than those who grow up in intact nuclear families (see Sigle-Rushton & 
McLanahan, 2004 for a review). However, such patterns do not necessarily provide clear-cut 
evidence of paternal investment.  
As stated earlier, in non-forager societies, most resources tend to be owned by males. 
Such societies involve the exploitation of subsistence niches which allow the accumulation of 
resources (including land in agricultural populations, animals in pastoralist communities, and 
money and other assets in market-economies), which men take control of in order to attract 
mates. These resources are then used to provide for children, but whether this is primarily 
mating or parenting effort is open to question. The positive relationship between paternal 
resources and beneficial child outcomes may be a side effect of male monopolisation of 
resources resulting in female preferences for male resources: in other words, men may 
accumulate resources in order to attract women; women then use these resources to raise 
children successfully. Disentangling mating from parenting effort may again be impossible, 
given that other forms of resource transfer can serve both mating and parenting purposes 
simultaneously, just as does the transfer of meat.   
But fathers are not simply providers of resources, they can perform other services for 
children, such as protecting them from other males, direct care, teaching subsistence skills, and 
support in social interactions or conflicts. All these activities are likely to be beneficial for 
children (though this is rarely quantified), but again it is difficult to determine whether such 
behaviours can entirely be considered paternal investment, or whether mating effort might also 
be involved. The existence and extent of such behaviours certainly varies between societies, 
suggesting that they may be at least partially dependent on whether there are alternative mating 
opportunities available. The few tests which have attempted to determine whether this is a factor 
in paternal behaviour suggest that the relative ease with which men can find other mates is 
indeed important. Blurton Jones and colleagues (2000) investigated divorce in four forager 
populations, and concluded that the availability of alternative mating partners was a better 
predictor of divorce than the benefits that children gained from the presence of fathers. Again 
we return to the conclusion that paternal investment is facultative. What fathers do for children 
may well benefit them (intentionally or not), but there are at least some occasions when men will 
cut short such benefits if alternative reproductive options are available. 
Proximate mechanisms of paternal care 
One final piece of evidence on paternal investment relates to the proximate determinants 
of male care. Hormonal changes during and after pregnancy may promote maternal care in 
women (Ellison & Gray, 2009). Recent research suggests men also undergo hormonal changes 
in relation to their marital and paternal status, which may promote shifts in strategy between 
mating and parenting effort. In some populations, including our own, testosterone is lower in 
married than single men, and lower in fathers compared to non-fathers (Burnham et al., 2003; 
Gray et al., 2004; Gray et al., 2006). This may be correlated with the relative amounts of effort 
devoted towards attracting a mate compared to investing in children – the former may require 
competitive behaviour facilitated by high levels of testosterone, the latter more affiliative 
behaviours which require lower levels of this hormone.  
Research emerging from non-Western populations, suggests there may be some variation 
in these hormonal shifts between populations. In a polygynous Kenyan sample, for example, 
testosterone was not lower in married compared to single men, possibly because in polygynous 
societies even married men continue to invest relatively heavily in mating effort (Gray, 2003). A 
Tanzanian study compared a high paternal care population, Hadza hunter-gatherers, with a low 
paternal care population, Datoga pastoralists, and confirmed the authors’ prediction that 
testosterone would be lower in fathers in the high paternal care group, but not the low paternal 
care group (Muller et al., 2009). Such proximate, hormonal correlates of paternal status and 
paternal care suggest that men do have adaptations which allow them to shift into a parenting 
mode (or at least allocate a certain proportion of resources to parenting, rather than mating, 
effort) but that these adaptations are flexible and sensitive to environmental conditions. 
In summary, paternal investment is facultative in our species. There is both inter- and 
intra-population variation in how much men invest in children, and exactly what they do for 
children. Male (not necessarily paternal) care and provisioning does seem important, however, 
given that the male contribution to the diet is often substantial. Whether this is primarily mating 
or parenting effort may be difficult to assess: it probably serves both functions. Rather than 
assuming that any act on the part of a male which improves child outcomes is paternal 
investment, it may be better to consider carefully exactly what men are doing and why. 
Who else invests? 
So fathers are contributing to child well-being, but these contributions vary quite 
substantially between and within populations, and are sometimes negligible. Does this mean that 
women who can rely on relatively little paternal support must absorb the full burden of raising 
children? It appears not, since raising human children is a very energetically intensive exercise, 
probably too expensive for mothers to manage alone. Women instead rely on help from other 
quarters. The question of whether humans are cooperative breeders has been raised in recent 
years, given this very heavy burden of parenting (Hrdy, 2005, 2009). Cooperative breeders are 
those species where non-parental care of young is common. Cooperative breeding is a relatively 
rare strategy, commonest in birds, where it is estimated that 9% of species breed cooperatively 
(Clutton-Brock, 1991; Cockburn, 2006). The strategy is less common in mammals, but a handful 
of species, including some canids, meercats, naked mole rats and callitrichids do it.  
Recent research suggests that humans can be added to that list (Foster & Ratnieks, 2005). 
In our species it seems that relatives, particularly older women and pre-reproductive children, 
are the ‘helpers-at-the-nest’ who allow women to raise many dependent children simultaneously. 
It has been known for some time that children contribute considerably to the household 
economy, thereby effectively underwriting their parents’ subsequent fertility (Lee & Kramer, 
2002; Kramer, 2005). Older individuals also may continue to be productive long after they have 
any dependent children of their own, suggesting grandparental, particularly grandmaternal, 
effort is important in our species (Bock & Johnson, 2008; Hawkes et al., 1989).  
Grandmothers and older children are ideal ‘helpers-at-the-nest’ since they are not 
occupied with children of their own. Pre- and post-reproductive individuals do not, in fact, have 
the option of producing their own offspring. A hypothesis gaining ground is that the unusual 
feature of human menopause may have evolved precisely because of such beneficial 
grandmaternal effects (Hawkes et al., 1997; Shanley et al., 2007). It is certainly becoming clear 
that grandmothers are often very important to child well-being. Several evolutionary 
anthropologists have now tested the hypothesis that children with grandmothers present will 
have better outcomes, including survival rates, than those without grandmothers. A review of 
this literature found that maternal grandmothers were particularly beneficial, their presence 
improving child survival in just under 70% of cases (Sear & Mace, 2008; see Figure 7.1). 
Paternal grandmothers were also often beneficial, though less commonly than maternal 
grandmothers, improving child survival in about half of the populations studied.  
It is difficult to assess the contributions of older children within the household, since 
sibling relationships are characterised by competition as well as cooperation, but there was 
evidence that the presence of siblings old enough to act as helpers-at-the-nest was also 
frequently beneficial to children (Sear & Mace, 2008; see Figure 7.1). An additional strategy 
which women can use to help raise children is to seek investment from men other than the 
child’s father. Polyandrous mating, found in partible paternity societies, may be one such 
strategy which women use to confuse issues of paternity, and convince other men to invest in 
their children (Hrdy, 2000). Children with more than one father in such populations have been 
found to have higher survival rates than those with only one father (Beckerman et al., 1998; Hill 
& Hurtado, 1996). This may be brought about by the provisioning of breeding couples by other 
adult males, which has just been demonstrated in one partible paternity society (Hill & Hurtado, 
2009). Overall this review provides empirical evidence that humans are indeed cooperative 
breeders, but that we adopt a relatively flexible cooperative breeding strategy, with help coming 
from many different potential sources, varying both between and within societies. ‘Parental’ 
investment may not just come from parents, but several other individuals too.  
Familial conflict 
The preceding section should not give the impression that family relations are always 
entirely harmonious. Within the family there is also considerable conflict. Trivers (1974) was 
the first to develop the concept of parent-offspring conflict. Parents and offspring will disagree 
about the optimal amount of investment given to each offspring. Parents in iteroparous species 
like our own must allocate their effort carefully between all their offspring to maximise fitness. 
But each offspring wants parents to invest more in itself than its siblings, since each offspring 
can gain greater fitness from its own reproduction than from that of its siblings.  
This conflict between parents and offspring over investment has been well studied in the 
context of pre-natal investment. Haig (1993, 1996a) has suggested that the desire of offspring to 
extract more investment than the mother wants to give leads to an arms race during pregnancy. 
The foetus develops adaptations which try and extract as many nutrients as possible from the 
mother; the mother develops adaptations to protect herself from the foetus’s demands. The 
foetus is at an advantage in placental mammals, since it has direct access to the mother’s 
bloodstream through the placenta. Haig proposes that obstetric problems such as gestational 
diabetes and pre-eclampsia in our own species may result directly from the foetus’s attempts to 
manipulate maternal energy supplies through placental hormones, and the mother’s attempts to 
resist the foetus’s manipulations.  
Such conflicts during pregnancy may be exacerbated by conflicts between, not just the 
mother and foetus, but between maternal and paternal genes within the foetus (Haig, 1996). 
During a pregnancy the mother may be trying to keep resources in reserve for future 
reproduction, but the father of the child may not be related to any of the mother’s future 
children. Paternal genes within the foetus may, therefore, be interested in extracting more 
nutrients from the mother for the current offspring than maternal genes. Such conflict may be 
implicated not just in disorders of pregnancy, but also behavioural disorders of children. Prader-
Willi syndrome, for example, may be a disorder accidentally resulting from this conflict between 
maternal and paternal genes, as it is associated with behaviours which reduce the mother’s costs 
of childrearing (and therefore represents a ‘win’ for maternal genes: Haig & Wharton, 2003).  
Siblings will also compete among themselves for parental resources. Sibling competition 
reaches its most extreme form in siblicidal bird species (see Lawson, in this volume). Such 
within-family homicide is relatively unusual in humans, but is sometimes seen where very 
valuable resources are at stake. Historical accounts of the relatively homicide-prone Vikings 
have been analysed to demonstrate that the probability of an individual killing a close relative 
depended on the value of the resources at stake: high rewards were necessary before the murder 
of a relative became likely (Dunbar et al., 1995). Usually, however, sibling competition takes a 
more subtle form, involving variations in how much investment children can acquire from 
parents, observed as apparent biases in parental investment (discussed below).  
What is invested? 
Who invests in human children is relatively complex, but so too is the question of what is 
invested. Parental investment can be both pre-natal (for mothers only) or post-natal (all other 
investors). Pre-natal care involves investing somatic resources in offspring – mothers sustain 
pregnancy by directly transferring reserves of energy to the foetus. Mothers continue to invest 
somatically after birth, during breastfeeding. Mothers and other individuals have important roles 
in provisioning children after birth with food, and protecting and cleaning them – all activities 
which take time and therefore involve opportunity costs. Human children also need considerable 
investment beyond simply ensuring they survive to reproductive maturity in order to ensure they 
become productive and competitive adults.  
All human societies, whatever mode of subsistence they use, involve skills which need to 
be taught to children. Such training takes more time, and may also involve the transfer of extra-
somatic resources (those stored outside the body). Parents may continue to invest after offspring 
reach reproductive maturity. In societies which accumulate extra-somatic resources, parents 
commonly transfer such resources directly to children in order to launch them onto the marriage 
market, including bridewealth and dowry payments (the former involve transfers from groom’s 
to bride’s family, the latter from bride to groom). The final transfer which occurs from parents to 
children occurs after death, when parents pass on any accumulated resources to their offspring. 
Such transfers are still likely to be costly to the parent and therefore fit the definition of parental 
investment, though they occur after death, since resources may be accumulated with the express 
purpose of donating to children, and not used during the parent’s own lifetime. 
It is worth noting that parental investment is often measured indirectly. Determining 
exactly how much energy parents are transferring to children, how much time they spend on 
them and what extra-somatic resources are being transferred is not always easy. Instead, parental 
investment is frequently measured by determining its end result, the effects on the child 
(Borgerhoff Mulder, 1998). The following is a by no means compete list of variables which have 
been used as indicators of parental investment: child survival rates, nutritional status, 
immunisation rates, attendance at medical clinics, length of birth intervals, educational 
attainment, age at marriage, and inheritance bequests. Measuring child outcomes rather than 
parental investment itself is problematic since such outcomes are likely to correlate with, but may 
not match exactly, parental investment itself.  
An additional problem with measuring parental investment in our species is that not all 
forms of investment are equal, so that different parental investment patterns may be been seen if 
different measures of parental investment are examined. Social scientists have made a distinction 
between base and surplus resources (Downey, 2001). The former are those required for basic 
survival and adequate health; the latter those that enhance child well-being and social 
competitiveness over and above that which is necessary to ensure survival alone. All children 
need base resources, but parents can choose to allocate surplus resources differentially between 
children. Such a distinction may be of lesser value in the evolutionary literature, since a child that 
survives but is not sufficiently competitive to reproduce successfully is not particularly useful in 
terms of Darwinian fitness, but still may have some heuristic worth.  
For example, a study in rural Ethiopia found that biases in parental investment became 
stronger for ‘surplus’ resources (education) under conditions of reduced environmental risk, but 
not for ‘base’ resources (breastfeeding and immunisation: Gibson & Lawson, 2009), suggesting 
that parents do allocate varying types of investment differently. Distinctions should also be made 
between shareable and non-shareable resources (Downey, 2001). Certain forms of parental 
investment, such as parental energy reserves or extra-somatic capital, are non-shareable – any 
unit of energy or wealth given to one child cannot be given to another. But other forms of 
investment, perhaps certain types of teaching or, in modern societies, the presence of a computer 
in the household, can more easily be shared between siblings. Again different patterns of parental 
investment may be seen for shareable and non-shareable resources. 
Who is invested in? 
Perhaps the most commonly asked question in the parental investment literature focuses 
on who parents invest in. Parents do not necessarily invest equally in all their offspring, but will 
bias their investment towards those offspring likely to provide the greatest fitness return. As 
Hrdy (2000b) has pointed out, ‘mother love’, and therefore investment, is not automatic and 
unconditional, but will be contingent on the characteristics of both child and mother, just as 
paternal investment is facultative (the same applies to any other relative who may potentially 
invest in a child). Humans are relatively unusual among primates in that they will sometimes 
retrench entirely on post-natal parental investment, by abandoning or killing children (Daly & 
Wilson, 1984). This practice is likely to be related to the intense investment needed in human 
children after birth to raise them successfully to adulthood. While both infanticide and 
abandonment are relatively rare, they are known to occur at least occasionally in the majority of 
human cultures, and to occur in situations where the prospects of raising that particular child 
successfully are low. More common are more subtle manipulations of parental investment: all 
children might be invested in, but some are more invested in than others. This bias in parental 
investment has been investigated most intensively for two characteristics of the child: birth order 
and sex.  
Birth order 
At the simplest level, birth order is likely to affect the amount of parental investment 
children receive because of the trade-off between the quantity and quality of offspring, known in 
the social sciences as the ‘resource dilution’ effect (Downey, 2001): higher birth order children 
(that is, children with many older siblings) will receive less investment than lower birth order 
children since the former only exist in large families, and parental resources are spread more 
thinly in large, compared to small, families. In fact, all else being equal, the parental investment 
that each child receives will take the form of y = 1/x, where x is the number of children in the 
family. But all else is not equal. Children of different birth orders will differ systematically in 
other ways, so that much ink has been spilt trying to determine whether birth order in and of 
itself affects parental investment.  
Both the social science and evolutionary literature is filled with studies investigating the 
effects of birth order on traits from personality (Sulloway, 1996), intelligence (Kristensen & 
Bjerkedal, 2007), and educational achievement (Travis & Kohli, 1995; Bock, 2002), to status 
(Davis, 1997) and career achievement (Lindert, 1977), to mortality (Manda, 1999; Lynch & 
Greenhouse, 1994) and anthropometric status (Lawson & Mace, 2008; Floyd, 2005), to sexual 
orientation (Bogaert, 2006), familial sentiment (Salmon & Daly, 1998), all the way up to 
reproductive success (Mace, 1996; Draper & Hames, 2000; Borgerhoff Mulder, 1998). The 
problem with this literature is that many studies fail to adequately control for the many factors 
which could cause spurious correlations between birth order and these outcomes, such as family 
size, socioeconomic status and parental resources, and the differing ages and needs of children 
(see Box 7.2).  
------------------------ 
Insert Box 7.2 about here 
------------------------ 
This has led to something of a backlash against birth order studies in the social science 
literature, and calls for much greater methodological rigour (Steelman et al., 2002; Wichman et 
al., 2006; Somit et al., 1996). Birth order research tends to be accepted somewhat less critically 
in the evolutionary literature, perhaps because there are good evolutionary reasons why parents 
should invest differently in children of different birth orders, regardless of resource dilution 
effects: children of different birth orders will differ in both age and the level and type of 
investment they require (which does not mean, of course, that such studies should not also be 
carefully assessed for methodological rigour).  
Child’s age will affect predicted investment patterns because age is correlated with 
reproductive value. Reproductive value is defined as the expected future reproductive output of 
an individual, at a given age (Fisher, 1930). It is the product of both surviving and successfully 
reproducing, both of which vary strongly by age. In our species, mortality is highest 
immediately after birth, declines to a low point in late childhood, then begins a more-or-less 
continuous rise at adolescence before increasing rapidly among elderly adults (Gurven & 
Kaplan, 2006). Reproductive value follows a similar path: newborn children have a relatively 
low reproductive value; it increases as children age before peaking at the average age at first 
birth, when individuals have a high expectation of future reproductive output (see Figure 7.2; 
reproductive value curves may also differ for sons and daughters).  
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 7.2 about here 
------------------------ 
All else being equal, then, older children have higher reproductive value than younger 
children, so that older children might be expected to be favoured over younger. This leads to the 
prediction that older children will always receive higher parental investment than younger, at 
least up to the point of sexual maturity. This may explain why early born children do frequently 
seem to be advantaged in a variety of outcomes. When infanticide occurs, for example, it is very 
commonly the younger child in which investment is terminated, not older children. Among Ache 
hunter-gatherers in Paraguay, a group in which rather remarkably high rates of child homicide 
are seen, 5% of all children born were killed in their first year of life, compared to about 2% of 
children killed per year between the ages of 5 and 9 (Hill & Hurtado, 1996). This conforms with 
findings from a cross-cultural survey that younger children, as well as those of low reproductive 
value for reasons of deformity or ill-health, were much more vulnerable to infanticide (Daly & 
Wilson, 1984).  
Counteracting the trend for older children to get higher parental investment because of 
their greater reproductive value is that parents also invest according to the child’s need or, more 
technically, the marginal value of that parental investment to each child (Clutton-Brock, 1991). 
A unit of parental care given to a ten-year old child may improve its survival chances slightly, 
but the same unit of parental care given to a newborn may increase the newborn’s chances of 
survival much more dramatically. Newborns may, therefore, get more investment from mothers, 
in terms of both nutrition and time, because the marginal value of that investment is greater for 
younger children. Jeon (2008) has recently attempted to theoretically model the solutions to this 
dilemma for parents – should they invest more in older children because they have higher 
reproductive value or younger children because they derive greater marginal returns to 
investment? – and concluded that in the majority of cases parents should resolve this dilemma in 
favour of older children.  
Perhaps the most extreme form of this favouring of oldest children is primogeniture: 
when the oldest child (usually in fact the eldest son) inherits all or most parental resources. 
While almost every pattern of bequeathing wealth from parents to offspring is seen in human 
societies – oldest son or daughter inherits (primogeniture), youngest son or daughter inherits 
(ultimogeniture), all children or all children of favoured sex inherit equally – primogeniture is 
the most common pattern, certainly where parents differentiate between children in their 
inheritance (Murdock, 1967; Hrdy & Judge, 1993). Such a pattern may stem from a couple of 
other advantages of investing in first-borns: firstly, that this gives parents more time to 
contribute to this child’s reproductive success; and secondly, that investing heavily in the eldest 
child may well shorten generation times, which will ultimately increase the fitness of the 
parental lineage. Such extreme biases in parental investment are only seen where resource-
holding is essential for reproductive success, however, and where resources are limited, so that 
bequeathing wealth to more than one child risks diluting that wealth until it becomes almost 
useless for reproductive success.  
Patterns of investment by birth order may not always favour early-born offspring, or at 
least may not always result in a linear relationship between birth order and child outcomes. 
Firstborn children tend to have lower birthweights than later-borns (e.g. Magadi et al., 2001), 
though it is not clear whether this results from maternal investment decisions or confounding 
factors such as selection effects (women who are not particularly successful at reproducing will 
be over-represented among the mothers of first births). Hints that later born children do better 
than early born children in that they are able to produce more children than early-borns come 
from a study of southern African hunter-gatherers, the Ju/’hoansi (Draper & Hames, 2000: 
though this study did not control for potentially confounding factors). U-shaped effects of birth 
order have been found for the number of children produced, though not number of children 
reared to adulthood, for males in historical Finland (Faurie et al., 2009). Such patterns could 
partially result from the cooperative effects of elder siblings, and therefore children benefiting 
from non-parental investment. But Hertwig et al. (2002) have cautioned that unequal outcomes 
can arise from an ‘equity heuristic’, a decision rule stating that parents should invest equally in 
all their children. They argue that, even if at any one time parents invest equally across all 
offspring, middle-borns will always receive less cumulative investment than first- or last-borns 
because they never benefit from an exclusive period of parental investment (see Figure 7.3).  
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 7.3 about here 
------------------------ 
Thus, a ‘middle-born disadvantage’ can arise even if parents show no bias towards any of 
their offspring. This is based on the assumption, however, that parents only invest while children 
are resident in the parental household, which is likely not to hold across all measures of parental 
investment in our species, since parents continue to invest in children throughout their lives. One 
final complication is that, where parents invest unequally in sons and daughters (see next 
section), the equity heuristic will not hold. In this case, what may be relevant to the child is 
same-sex birth order, so a modification of the middle-born disadvantage might be that it will 
only hold when same sex siblings are considered, as in historical Finland where a middle-born 
disadvantage in fertility was seen only for male offspring (Faurie et al., 2009). 
Sex-biases in investment  
One of the richest veins of literature on parental investment is on sex biases in parental 
investment. In a population with an even sex ratio, the average number of grandoffspring 
produced by a son and a daughter will be the same but, given that the variance in reproductive 
success differs between the sexes (usually, but not always, higher in males), the riskiness of 
producing sons rather than daughters will differ, sons being the higher risk sex in populations 
where male variance in reproductive success is higher than female. More importantly, parental 
investment may have differential impacts on sons versus daughters. Under certain 
circumstances, a unit of parental investment may be more valuable to a son than a daughter, if it 
can increase his reproductive output relatively more than the same unit of parental investment 
given to his sister.  
This is the principle behind what is perhaps the most common framework for 
investigating sex biases in investment: the Trivers-Willard hypothesis (TWH: Trivers & Willard, 
1973). As formulated for non-human species, it concerns pre-natal investment and states that, if 
three conditions hold, then the sex ratio at birth (SRB) should vary in predictable ways. These 
conditions are: (1) that the condition of the mother (investor) is correlated with the condition of 
the young at the end of the period of parental investment; (2) that the condition of the young at 
the end of parental investment should endure into adulthood and; (3) that one sex should benefit 
more from good condition than the other.  
Typically, males benefit more from good condition than females: given the generally 
greater variance in male than female reproductive success, males in good condition can out-
compete poor condition males and achieve high reproductive success. Females in good condition 
may also out-compete females in poor condition, but the discrepancy between females in good 
and poor condition will be much less than the discrepancy between males in good and poor 
condition (see Figure 7.4). So the TWH predicts that mothers in good condition will produce 
relatively more sons and mothers in poor condition will produce relatively more daughters.  
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 7.4 about here 
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Numerous attempts have been made to find evidence of the TWH in SRBs in our species, 
with varying degrees of success (see Box 7.3 for the typical SRB of our species). Most of these 
have measured parental condition as ‘status’ (including wealth, education and social class): 
Lazarus (2002) reported that of 54 analyses in the literature testing the TWH in humans, 26 
(48%) supported the hypothesis. Fewer studies have attempted to test the TWH using measures 
of physiological condition, but with similarly mixed results. A strong effect of lower nutritional 
status resulting in more female births was found in a poorly nourished Ethiopian population 
(Gibson & Mace, 2003; see Figure 7.5). Lower pre-pregnancy energy intake was also found to 
correlate with fewer male births in a British sample (Mathews et al., 2008), but Stein and 
colleagues (2004) found no effect of acute undernutrition on SRB during the Dutch famine. The 
British study rather unfortunately also reported that women who ate breakfast cereals were more 
likely to produce boys, a somewhat unlikely finding which was widely reported across the media 
and raised doubts in the minds of other scientists as to the quality of the study (Young et al., 
2009). Such a finding, which could easily be interpreted as a statistical quirk, highlights one of 
the potential problems with finding a Trivers and Willard effect: any effect sizes are likely to be 
small, which makes identifying such biases in the SRB statistically challenging (Gelman & 
Weakliem,2009).  
------------------------ 
Insert Box 7.3 and Figure 7.5 about here 
----------------------- 
A wider problem with identifying the Trivers and Willard effect is that many studies do 
not demonstrate the three conditions necessary for the TWH to hold in their study populations 
(Brown, 2001), nor do they give much thought to the mechanism by which biased sex ratios 
could be brought about. Some authors do attempt to test the pre-conditions (e.g., Cameron & 
Dalerum, 2009), and some are attempting to tackle the latter problem (e.g., Grant, 1998) but, as 
with birth order studies, research investigating the TWH in human populations should be judged 
on its individual merits.   
In addition to SRB studies, there is plentiful research investigating whether the TWH 
holds for post-natal investment. In some respects, patterns of biased post-natal investment 
should be easier to investigate, since the mechanisms of biased post-natal investment can 
potentially be investigated directly (Cronk, 2007). At least some such studies have also 
attempted to determine whether the pre-conditions for the TWH hold, in particular whether the 
reproductive success of sons and daughters differs by parental status. Even if manipulating sex 
ratios before birth is mechanistically tricky, infanticide may be used as a means of postnatally 
adjusting the sex ratios of children. Dickemann’s (1979) classic study of historical literature in 
Asia and Europe observed that female infanticide was much more common among upper social 
strata: she cited one high caste Indian group which claimed never to have let a female child born 
within the caste to live. This fits with the TWH since high status males are more likely to find 
wives than low status males, given that hypergyny is common in stratified societies (women, but 
not men, can marry into higher social classes). High status females, on the other hand, will face 
fierce competition for mates in the few social strata where marriage is acceptable for them, 
whereas low status females should have no trouble finding marriage partners.  
Biased parental investment does not need to be as extreme as infanticide, however. 
Patterns of parental investment favouring girls, but which stop short of infanticide, have been 
found in two contemporary populations. Mukogodo pastoralists in Kenya (Cronk, 1989) and 
Hungarian gypsies (Bereczkei and Dunbar, 1997) show preferential treatment of girls in terms 
of, variously, breastfeeding duration, medical treatment, and education. Both are societies in 
which females have higher potential reproductive success by marrying into neighbouring 
wealthier groups, whereas males face competition between men from both within and outside 
the community for mates. At a much later stage in development, Mace (1996) interpreted a bias 
in inheritance patterns towards males in Gabbra pastoralists in Kenya as adaptive within a 
society where males benefit much more from inherited wealth (by becoming polygynous) than 
females do. This particular parental bias cannot be ascribed to the TWH, since all parents give 
wealth to sons in this society, but fits in with the principle which can be generalised from the 
TWH that parents will invest their resources strategically in order to gain the greatest fitness 
return. 
The TWH is not the only candidate for explaining sex-biased parental investment, just the 
most tested. Other possible explanations are local resource enhancement (Emlen et al., 1986) or 
local resource competition (Clark, 1978; Silk, 1983). In the former case, children who enhance 
their parent’s reproductive success, for example, by helping out with childcare may be favoured. 
In the latter case, children that compete with parents or other siblings for local resources may be 
disfavoured. Biased breast-feeding patterns in favour of daughters have been suggested to result 
from local resource enhancement effects in two populations where daughters are known to 
provide childcare: Hutterites (a north American Anabaptist sect: Margulis et al., 1993, and a 
Caribbean community: Quinlan et al., 2005). As previously noted, daughters frequently provide 
childcare and other services to mothers, but daughter-biased investment tends to be relatively 
uncommon. Instead, such explanations will only apply if daughters are particularly helpful 
compared to sons, which appears to be the case at least in the Caribbean example: a matrifocal 
society which girls are more productive than boys within the household (Quinlan et al., 2005).  
Local resource enhancement/competition explanations are sometimes explicitly given by 
parents as the reason why sons are favoured in patrilocal societies, where sons stay in the family 
home and contribute to the household economy, but daughters marry out (“daughters are like 
crows, you feed them then they fly away”). That more contemporary societies are patrilocal 
rather than matrilocal may explain why stated preferences tend to be much more common for 
male rather than female offspring (Arnold 1992), though we should perhaps interpret such 
statements with caution, since what people say and what they do are not necessarily the same 
thing. Pennington and Harpending (1993) documented what appeared to be daughter preference 
in the Herero, cattle pastoralists in Botswana: girls were much more likely to survive childhood 
than boys. The authors attributed these effects to local resource enhancement: daughters brought 
in cattle at marriage, which could be used to marry off sons. But the Herero themselves did not 
attribute the higher survival of girls to daughter preference (at least in conversations with 
anthropologists). Instead, they claimed this was the result of witchcraft directed at women with 
many sons, stemming from jealousy of such fortunate women. The authors’ own observations, 
along with those of nearby ethnic groups, however, attributed this discrepancy squarely to biased 
parental investment, in particular noting that the Herero simply did not feed their sons as well as 
their daughters. 
Interactions between birth order and sex biases 
 The complicated nature of both birth order effects and sex biases in parental investment 
means that neither should be examined in isolation. The combination of the differential costs of 
raising boys and girls, the differential reproductive returns of each, plus local resource 
competition and enhancement effects often mean that a simple preference for boys or girls, or 
children of a particular birth order are not seen. Even in societies with a clear expressed 
preference for sons, certain sons may be more favoured than others, just as some daughters may 
be less discriminated against than others. Discrimination against girls may be particularly harsh 
against girls with many older sisters, showing up as increased mortality rates for such girls (Das 
Gupta, 1987; Muhuri & Preston, 1991). Similarly boys with many older brothers may be 
discriminated against even in societies which apparently bias investment towards sons: in 
Gabbra pastoralists, later born boys receive relatively little inherited wealth and marry age at a 
later age than their elder brothers (Mace, 1996).  
Borgerhoff Mulder (1998) investigated parental biases by both birth order and sex in an 
attempt to distinguish between the TWH and local resource enhancement/competition models in 
Kipsigis agropastoralists in Kenya. She found that the results varied according to measure of 
parental investment. A TWH effect was evident in education, for example, with richer parents 
favouring sons and poorer parents favouring daughters, which was consistent with stronger 
effects of wealth on the reproductive success of males than of females in this population. There 
was also evidence of both local competition and enhancement between siblings, however. 
Brothers seemed to compete reproductively with one another, but gain benefits from sisters, so 
that parents invested more in sons with few brothers and in sons with many sisters. Girls were 
less affected by their siblings and predictably also experienced less biased parental investment 
according to their number of brothers or sisters. Borgerhoff Mulder’s (1998) conclusion was that 
studies of parental investment biases should consider a broad range of socio-ecological factors 
constraining parental options and payoffs, the value of children and the costs of parental 
investment, as well as which measures of investment are appropriate for comparing investment 
patterns between the sexes and between classes, an appropriately holistic conclusion with which 
to leave the subject of parental biases between children. 
How parental condition affects who is invested in 
One further factor to consider when investigating parental investment is the 
characteristics of the parent. Just as the child’s reproductive value varies with age, so does the 
parent’s, more precisely, parental reproductive value will decline throughout the reproductive 
period. This may influence parental decisions on whether to invest in children. Abortion and 
infanticide rates are higher among young than older women, since older women have fewer 
opportunities to replace such children (Daly & Wilson, 1984; Lycett & Dunbar, 1999). It will 
also influence how much to invest. A well-known hypothesis, but one which has so far received 
relatively little support, is the terminal investment hypothesis (Williams, 1966). This states that 
parental investment should increase in later, and particularly last-born, offspring, since there will 
be no need to conserve resources for future children.  
There is some support for this hypothesis in our species in that rates of twinning and 
children born with genetic abnormalities increase with maternal age (Forbes, 1997). This has 
been suggested to result from a relaxation of the screening process which screens out less than 
optimal conceptuses in younger women. Since such screening mechanisms may result in false 
positives, where healthy foetuses are terminated in error, a relaxation of such mechanisms may 
result in at least some chance of a healthy birth for older women (Forbes, 1997). Otherwise, the 
evidence for terminal investment in humans is not strong, perhaps because other aspects of 
parental condition may also change with parental age (Fessler et al., 2005).  
Other parental characteristics which change with age, and which may result in higher 
investment towards the end of a parent’s reproductive life are experience and accumulated 
resources. Increasing experience may explain why first births are at particular risk of dying 
(Hobcraft et al., 1985). In societies with inherited wealth, resources tend to accumulate with age, 
and in wage economies, salaries may increase with age and experience. Food production in 
subsistence societies may follow a more curvilinear pattern, with younger and older adults 
relatively less efficient than adults in middle-age, as it is often related to changes in physical 
condition and strength (Hill & Hurtado, 1996; Bock & Johnson, 2008). It is this decline in 
physiological condition with age which may prove the nail in the coffin of the terminal 
investment hypothesis. A recent theoretical investigation by McNamara et al. (2009) found that, 
if both changes in parental reproductive value and parental condition with age are factored into 
the model, then parental investment is predicted to decline, and not increase, with age, 
suggesting that constraints on behaviour need to be carefully considered as well as the 
behaviour’s potential adaptive benefits. 
The role of environmental quality and risk 
To finish this section on parental investment, we should consider the effects of 
environmental quality and risk – both of which will affect parental condition, ability to invest 
and the potential payoffs to investment. Environmental risk may affect both overall parental 
effort and how biased parental effort is. High risk may result in reduced effort overall: if parents 
cannot predictably ameliorate environmental risks to their offspring, there may be little point 
wasting effort trying to do so (Quinlan, 2007). High environmental risk may also result in a ‘bet-
hedging’ strategy whereby parents discriminate little between children in investment, since they 
are unable to determine with confidence which children will survive and prosper. Such a 
strategy has been observed among educational investment in South African children (Liddell et 
al., 2003).  
Similarly, chronic conditions of resource scarcity may result in relatively low investment 
and limited discrimination between children, since under such conditions parents are unable to 
fully control their children’s survival and reproductive chances. As resources become more 
abundant, parents become more biased in their investment, as heavy investment in few children 
becomes a safer bet. Evidence for this can again be seen in educational investment in two 
African populations, in rural Ethiopia and Malawi. In both societies, birth order biases in 
educational outcomes are stronger in wealthy, compared to poor families (Gibson & Sear, 2009). 
This increase in biased parental investment, and shift towards investing heavily in few, rather 
than little in many, offspring, has been proposed as an explanation for the fertility decline which 
is now universal across human societies (Mace, 2007).  
Conclusion 
The human species is one characterized by intensive parental investment, but also one 
where ‘parental’ investment may come from individuals other than the child’s parents. The 
evolution of the human family, as well as some of our physiological traits, may in fact have been 
guided by the need for parents to involve other relatives in the raising of expensive children, at 
different developmental stages. Our long period of dependence, requiring a transfer of skills as 
well as resources, introduces further complexity into ‘parental’ investment: what is invested also 
takes many different forms, both somatic and extra-somatic, and different patterns of investment 
may be seen for different types of investment. Measuring parental investment therefore requires a 
careful consideration of who invests, what is invested, who is being invested in, and in what kind 
of environment is the investment taking place, as well as carefully controlling for the many 
potentially confounding factors which could influence the measurement of such investment.  
The existing literature does not always take such a careful approach to the analysis of 
parental investment, so that it is important to carefully assess each study on its own merits. Such 
problems of measurement and methodology particularly beset the literature on birth order and 
sex-biases in parental investment, but are not absent from any section of the literature. Current 
research is rightly beginning to focus on getting the methods right in order to properly understand 
parental investment strategies (e.g. using advanced statistical techniques to control for 
confounding factors when investigating parental biases in investment: Lawson & Mace, 2008), 
and also beginning to test between alternative hypotheses for parental behaviour (essential if 
progress is to be made in interpreting parenting patterns: e.g. Winking et al., 2009).  
This chapter has taken a broad-brush approach to evolutionary psychology: much of the 
research described in this chapter has been done by evolutionary anthropologists and behavioural 
ecologists, who have been traditionally more interested in questions surrounding family 
relationships and parental investment than evolutionary psychology in the most narrow sense, 
whose focus tends to be on sexual selection. The emphasis of the former disciplines on 
traditional, high fertility societies has led to a growing understanding of parental investment in 
small-scale, subsistence economies, but a dearth of evidence of parenting strategies in 
industrialised, low fertility societies. These disciplines also tend to ignore the mechanisms by 
which particular behaviours are brought about. In order to fully understand parental investment 
strategies, evidence needs to be gathered from a range of environments in order to assess 
commonalities and variation in parenting, and an obvious way to fill the gap would be to expand 
parental investment research in modern societies (an exception is perhaps grandparental 
investment, which is not entirely neglected in industrialised societies: see, for example, Coall et 
al., 2009 and Euler & Weitzel, 1996). Social scientists have collated a large body of research on 
parenting in modern societies, but since they do not work within an evolutionary framework they 
do not always ask the questions that have relevance to evolutionary debates about parental 
investment. More evidence could also be gathered on the proximate determinants of parental care 
and the mechanisms by which biases in investment are brought about, perhaps investigating in 
more detail how parental ‘solicitude’ (Daly & Wilson, 1980) varies as a function of sex and birth 
order.    
Future research therefore needs to continue to develop good data collection and statistical 
techniques in order to fully control for confounding factors; to explicitly set up tests to 
distinguish between rival hypotheses for investment strategies; to focus more on identifying 
parental investment itself, rather than relying on child outcomes; to consider the mechanisms  by 
which patterns of investment are brought about; and to do all this across a range of different 
environments and economies, in order to develop a full understanding of human parenting and 
family relationships.  
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Box 7.1. The form of the human family. 
 
The human family is a diverse entity. Humans cluster with their kin and their mate(s), 
who co-operate to varying degrees in the raising of children and productive work, but exactly 
how such families organise varies between populations. Some form of socially recognised union 
between a man and woman is pretty much universal across human societies, though the stability 
and the length of these unions differ. Most cultures worldwide allow polygynous marriage (one 
man married to several wives; (Murdock & White, 1969). A marital system of polyandry, one 
woman married to several husbands, is rare but has been observed in a handful of populations, 
and a polyandrous mating system may be much more common (Hrdy, 2000). Numerically, the 
most common form of marriage which currently exists is monogamy, since the rise of socially 
imposed monogamy in some of the dominant global cultures (MacDonald, 1995). Socially 
imposed monogamy is a form of marriage maintained by social pressures and rules, even where 
other marriage forms may be ecologically viable. Usually, these marriage systems will involve 
co-residence between husbands and wives, but some may in some societies involve visiting 
unions or living-apart-together relationships. 
The nuclear family household, containing just a wife, husband and children residing in 
isolation from other kin, though the dominant family form in modern Western societies, is a 
rather rare family form. Instead, most couples will live with, or near, to either the wife’s or the 
husband’s relatives or both (the former is known as matrilocality or female-philopatry – females 
stay in the natal home; the latter known as patrilocality or male-philopatry). There is some 
debate in the literature about what ‘ancestral’ patterns of residence might be, since this may have 
an impact on the evolution of human social structure and other traits. There has been a long-
standing view that residence patterns throughout most of our species’ history have been 
patrilocal (Ember, 1978; Chapais, 2008). Early analysis of cross-cultural ethnographic data 
suggested most forager populations were patrilocal (Ember, 1978), but a careful reanalysis of 
these data found instead that not only was matrilocality much more common than had been 
believed, but also that forager residence patterns were very flexible (Alvarez, 2004). Foragers 
are mobile and can potentially move to reside with whichever kin are needed at any one time. In 
the early years of a marriage, at least, this residence often seems to be matrilocal, perhaps so that 
women have their own kin around to support them through the early, and difficult, years of 
childbearing (Blurton Jones et al., 2005).  
The advent of accumulated resources associated with the emergence of agriculture does 
seem to have resulted in a shift towards higher levels of patrilocality (Hrdy, 2000). Where men 
need to defend resources this may be easier if they cooperate with their male kin. Genetic 
evidence confirms that, in our recent past, females seem to have dispersed more widely than 
males (Wilkins & Marlowe, 2006). Even in patrilocal societies, however, women may still have 
access to their natal kin during a marriage, since dispersal tends to be neither very long-distance 
nor irreversible. So the distinction between patrilocality and matrilocality may not be quite as 
stark as it seems. The overall picture of the human family is one of flexibility, both between and 
within populations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 7.2. Are later-borns ‘born to rebel’? Birth order and personality differences 
 
One of the more influential ideas in the birth order literature is that birth order affects 
personality, a thesis given an evolutionary framework by Sulloway (1996) in his book Born to 
Rebel: Birth Order, Family Dynamics and Creative Lives. Evidence has steadily accumulated 
that birth order affects career achievement since Galton first observed in the 19th century that 
eminent scientists were more likely to be firstborns (Galton, 1874). Subsequent sociological 
research has suggested a mechanism for this differential, which is that it is driven by personality 
differences between birth orders (Ernst & Angst, 1983). Sulloway’s thorough survey of 
historical revolutions and the men who were responsible for them concluded that these 
differences could be boiled down to the conservative nature of firstborns compared to their more 
rebellious younger siblings. He argued that scientific breakthroughs, for example, had largely 
been driven by later-borns, such as Charles Darwin, since they were more capable of ‘thinking 
outside the box’.  
The evolutionary twist which Sulloway added was that these differences arise from 
sibling competition for parental investment. Children within the family all compete for parental 
resources, but because humans give birth to single children typically at several year intervals, 
the playing field is not level for sibling competition. Sulloway argued that children of different 
birth orders would therefore have to adopt different tactics for attracting parental attention. Early 
born children, with the advantage of being older, larger, and more cognitively advanced, could 
adopt a conservative niche within the family, emulating parental attitudes, while later-borns 
would of necessity be forced to adopt a different niche, involving more flexible and more risky 
behaviours, seizing opportunities for investment where they could. Salmon (1999, 2003; Salmon 
& Daly, 1998) has extended this research to examine variation in familial sentiment by birth 
order, arguing that middle-borns in particular, should be less family-oriented than first or 
lastborns, since middle-borns suffer the most sibling competition and the least parental 
investment. 
 Such research, while well-received within much of the evolutionary community, has been 
criticised for methodological flaws (e.g., see Townsend, 2000 and response: Sulloway, 2000). 
Sulloway’s work, for example, has been criticised for focusing on a rather biased sample of 
individuals (his survey of historically important figures is largely a survey of rich, white men) 
and also for not systematically taking into account differences between biological and 
‘functional’ birth order (the latter describing children, for example, whose elder siblings died 
young so that they were effectively raised as the firstborn child, even if they were not in reality 
the first child to be born to their parents; Freese et al., 1999). What will matter for sibling 
competition is not the actual birth placement of each child, but the number and order of the 
siblings each child had during the period of parental investment.  
The subsequent work by evolutionary psychologists such as Salmon similarly has 
methodological flaws. As with Sulloway’s work, it extrapolates a supposedly human universal 
from a very biased sample: like much evolutionary psychology, it depends entirely on a non-
random sample of college undergraduates. It also fails to control for potentially confounding 
factors, such as the age and residence of other siblings. Such methodological problems should 
not, however, be used to conclude that birth order has no effect on personality, or other traits for 
that matter. As described in the main text, there are sound evolutionary reasons why children of 
different birth orders should receive different levels of investment from parents. Instead, the 
reader should approach birth order research with appropriate caution, and judge each study on its 
own merits, including assessing whether it has satisfactorily dealt with potentially confounding 
factors.   
Box 7.3. Why are sex ratios at birth male-biased in Homo sapiens? 
 
On average, human sex ratios at birth (SRBs) are around 105 males to every 100 females. 
This male bias has traditionally been ascribed to Fisher’s original idea that parental investment 
in sons and daughters must be equal, given that on average the reproductive value of a male and 
a female must be equal (Fisher, 1930). The typically higher male mortality throughout childhood 
means that the average son will receive lower investment than the average daughter, since he 
will be more likely to die before the end of parental investment. The slight male bias at birth 
adjusts for this shorter period of parental care for males so that overall investment in males and 
females is equal. This hypothesis assumes that the marginal value of investment to each sex is 
the same, however, which the Trivers-Willard hypothesis (TWH) states may not always be the 
case (though the TWH attempts to explain within-species biases in sex ratios at birth, not a 
population-level phenomenon). Despite long-standing interest in evolutionary biology, then, the 
male-biased SRB in our species is not yet fully understood (Lazarus, 2002). This problem with 
predicting population-level sex ratios in other vertebrate species (Frank, 1990) has led some to 
argue that predicting individual variation in SRBs is likely to be a much more productive 
approach (West et al., 2002; West & Sheldon, 2002). 
 
Figure 7.1. Bars represent the percentage of studies in which the presence of that relative 
improved child survival, from a review of all studies which investigated the impact of particular 
relatives on child survival (Sear & Mace, 2008) 
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Figure 7.2. Reproductive value for women and men based on data from South Africa. From 
Bowles & Posel, 2005 (reproduced by permission of Nature Publishing Group).  
 
 
Figure 7.3. Spheres in the upper part of the figure represent resource allocation according to the 
equity heuristic as a function of birth rank in families with one, two, and three children. The bars 
in the lower part show the absolute and relative (i.e., calculated as a proportion of that for an only 
child) cumulative investments across four growth periods, or “years”). From Hertwig et al., 2002 
(reproduced by permission of American Psychological Association). 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4. Schematic of the conditions necessary for the Trivers-Willard hypothesis: 
reproductive success of sons must be greater for parents in good condition but the reproductive 
success of daughters must be higher for parents in poor condition 
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Figure 7.5. Higher sex ratio at birth in better nourished women in rural Ethiopia. From 
Gibson & Mace, 2003 (reproduced by permission of the Royal Society). 
 
 
  
 
 
 
